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THE SIGNIFYING MONKEY TALKS LITERATURE
William Seaton
Deep down in the jungles, way back in the sticks,
The animals had form ed a game called pool. The baboon was 
a slick.
Now a few stalks shook, and a few leaves fell.
Up popped the monkey one day, ’bout sharp as hell.
He had a one-button roll, two-button satch.
You know, one o f them  boolhipper coats with a belt in 
the back.
The baboon stood with a crazy rim,
Charcoal gray vine, and a stingy brim,
Handful o f dimes, pocket full o f herbs,
Eldorado Cadillac parked at the curb.1
T h is  M o n k ey  Is one o f the last representatives alive in oral literature o f the 
grand African tradition o f trickster figures, o f whom the best-known from 
Africa is Anansi and from America Aunt Dicy, John, and, o f course, Brer 
Rabbit. Stith Thom pson gives the names and addresses o f their kin around 
the world.
Like m any similar figures the signifying monkey manages to outwit his 
opponents by means o f verbal skill. Typically in the toasts he foments 
trouble and manipulates events by words alone. His signifying consists of 
artful use o f language, language used with meaningful indirection, and 
m etaphoric and ambiguous language. Now the signifying monkey is an 
excellent definition o f m an,2 for surely the extent if not the absolute exis­
tence o f hum an signifying practices sets the species apart from all others. 
Thus my tide may refer to the author o f an article such as this who is, after 
all, a signifying m onkey talking literature to other signifying monkeys, deliv­
ering, like Kafka’s ape Red Peter, a “Report for an Academy.” And one 
recalls that for Kafka signification is the thin and problematic line that 
divides the learned gathering from  the zoo. However, the signifying monkey 
o f the toast has m ore specific implications for literary study. Considering 
him as a representative no t o f all mankind in its signifying practices, but,
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m ore narrowly, o f the signifying practices o f oral and o f popular culture, he 
offers insights about the definition o f the literary that are too easily over­
looked by theorists exclusively concerned with high art texts.
The difficulties that accumulate when one attem pts to establish a general 
theory o f  literature w ithout adequate reference to the characteristics o f oral 
and popular forms will be evident in the briefest review o f the poles about 
which m ost discussion o f literary value has revolved since the Romantic era. 
Many critics and theorists, and not a few poets, have built their barricades 
around positions basically defined by the continuum  of tradition and innova­
tion. Some have aligned themselves with the rom antic impulse to privilege 
the innovative (W ordsworth when young, Pound, Shklovsky, Artaud), while 
others have celebrated the neo-classical emphasis on tradition (Arnold, 
Curtius, Leavis). Parallel polemical positions characterize the popular art/ 
high art controversy. Some valorize the popular specifically as tradition 
challenging in political terms (Bakhtin, Fiedler), while others attack it as 
destructive o f all culture (Adorno and Horkheimer, and Leo Lowenthal who 
says that popular art is “spurious,” and “the very counterconcept o f a rt”3).
Is the signifying monkey, then, to be given entry to Parnassus? If he is, 
m ust that entry depend on his challenging tradition and defamiliarizing 
language? The simple fact is that these disputes dissolve with the realization 
that every instance o f language, and certainly every literary artifact, is at 
once conforming and non-conforming. If it were not for the form er it would 
be incomprehensible, and the latter is necessitated by the fact that every 
context and occasion is different and so no two utterances can be exactly 
equivalent. This does not deny the reality o f the two poles: the m ost routine 
o f m orning greetings to co-workers can approach total repetition, while 
Lautgedichte and some other m odernist texts approach total unpredictability. 
The fact that theories o f art have been constructed about each and of the 
opposition is, however, suggestive o f the critical role that each plays in the 
aesthetic text. W hen Geoffrey o f Vinsauf said at the beginning o f the thir­
teenth century that the poet’s job  is to “rejuvenate” the language he includ­
ed both the retention and the distortion o f convention.4
It is quite true that certain genres are m ore conventional than others. 
There can be litde doubt that popular and oral literature are relatively 
predictable. This has been frequently noted and, indeed, constitutes the 
ground for m ost o f the attacks leveled against these genres for being boring, 
repetitive, and artless. In fact, those who cham pion specific oral and popular 
works often try to dem onstrate that their choices are acceptable according 
to the same old standards o f irony, innovation, and the like. But there is an 
equally aesthetic function for the opposites o f these qualities as well.
Like H om er and other oral literature, black American folk narratives tend 
to be highly formulaic. Regardless o f w hether their perform ers are brilliantly 
creative o r uninventive, they will make frequent use o f stock phrases, form u­
lae, repetitions, allusions, and fragments o f o ther texts. This is obviously true
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of blues lyrics and Elizabethan sonnets, but Julia Kristeva notes that in fact, 
“every text takes its shape as a mosaic o f citations.”5 Each o f the signifying 
monkey texts, and the o ther toasts Abrahams collected from the same milieu 
repeats words, phrases, and episodes from others, but each is also unique.
The place o f repetition in high art literary production is often masked by 
such terms as “learned style,” “awareness o f tradition,” and talk o f literary 
schools and o f topoi. In popular and oral texts, where it is m ost emphatic, 
it is often denigrated. Extreme conventionalization, close repetition as a sort 
o f intimate intertextuality, produces a familiarity with the words that is 
identified as automatized and algebrized by Shklovsky. But if language can 
only be devalued by repetition, why do the Philadelphia street-com er poets 
make such rich use o f it? Is their use o f repetition any less insistent than that 
in television programs, rom ance novels, pornography, and Homer? This 
is, o f course, the very concept on which Parry, Lord, and their followers 
founded and developed the notion o f the oral. Repetitiveness taken to 
extrem e forms, such as American Indian songs in which a b rief phrase is 
reiterated for hours, or religious liturgy where the same words are spoken 
weekly for centuries, is hardly the result o f incompetence or artlessness. It 
is simply a different aesthetic strategy.
Familiarization is evident in the formal conventions, the slang (the passage 
quoted at the outset requires m ore glossing than Chaucer), and the limited 
repertory o f the tellers o f signifying monkey tales. It appears also in larger 
descriptive cliches, in turns o f plot, in the thematic goods retailed through 
the work. This point is so obvious that it scarcely bears documentation. It 
is clear that, contrary to what Shklovsky has said, the repeated structures do 
not normally fade and disappear due to the automatization, rather they are 
underlined again and again specifically to im print them  m ore indelibly in 
the mental programs o f their consumers. In fact, it is the variable data that 
is m ore likely to carry a lesser semantic load, while constant repetition 
delineates central cultural components: sacrifice and rhetorical exchange in 
Homer, the Christians against the Saracens in medieval romance, the m ar­
ried couples’ embrace at the end o f a comedy, or the police getting their man 
at the end o f a cop show on television.
In “The Monkey and the Baboon,” formulae consisting o f a single word 
or phrase include “ ’bout sharp as hell,” “raise” (as a challenge), “fussing and 
fighting,” and a great m any others. The poem  is clearly oral by the standard 
o f economy. On the level o f larger units, formulae include such elements as 
the monkey-baboon contest itself (which is recorded in num erous songs and 
stories as well as these toasts, some identifying the com batants as “the white 
m an and the nigger”), the jungle setting (suggesting both African origins and 
the harshness o f urban American life), and the ritual description o f clothing 
worn by the main characters as set forth in the first lines quoted at the 
beginning o f this paper. His dress invests the m onkey with an aura o f taste 
and authority just as the merchandise sold at Smoky Jo e ’s in Chicago, or the
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zoot suits o f  the forties, or flamboyant Jam aican hairnet caps do. The verbal­
ly fluent reciter o f  the poem  seeks to appropriate the power unavailable to 
him  in American society by cleverness with words that identify him with the 
clever monkey, that is, by semiotic means. He uses the vocabulary o f cloth­
ing in the same way.
Social conflicts arising from racism, poverty, and male/female relations 
are evoked and then resolved in oral narratives like this one, in a way that 
closely fits Levi-Strauss’s concept o f m yth as the symbolic m ediation o f 
binary oppositions. Much o f shamanistic practice, too, follows this model o f 
sympathetic magic. To narrate a m yth in which the god defeats the dem on 
is to exorcise the illness from the patient, and this verbal technology is used 
in contem porary America as much as in tribal societies. Certain critical 
discussions o f popular culture, such as M attelart and Dorfm an’s How to Read 
Donald Duck, o r Fiske and Hartley’s Reading Television6 have centered on this 
function as a replicator o f ideological givens which masks contradiction. But 
these partisan views rarely consider the examples o f tribal societies which 
inculcate social norm s even m ore rigorously but toward ends m ore easily 
romanticized (see any issue o f Alcheringa o r the official art o f socialist coun­
tries). Indeed, the “classical” Chinese opera (which, in fact, is popular) and 
the m odem  revolutionary opera are the same in the formal sense o f using 
highly repetitive conventions to teach and reinforce ideology. This is the old 
H oratian ideal, upheld by E. D. Hirsch and others in the present day, o f 
instruction as a prim e function o f literature. Though the signifying monkey 
has seen the inside o f few schoolrooms, he teaches his audience a vision o f 
the world and themselves, complete with moral, aesthetic, and prudential 
values.
Repetitive structures are intrinsic to the nature o f literature because they 
bear the norm ative didactic inform ation it so often seeks to transmit. But 
the phenom enon is insufficiendy explained by the principle of indoctrina­
tion. Even Horace allowed pleasure an equal im portance (as, more reluctant­
ly, did Augustine), and quite likely Kid (from whom  Abrahams collected the 
text) would say that he recites poetry for amusement. W hat sort o f pleasure 
is available from  hearing the familiar yet once again (as the parent who reads 
aloud to his three-year-old may wonder)?
Eco says that the Superman comic books create a myth, partially because 
their appeal does no t reside in any single story, but rather accumulates as 
the regularities in a group o f texts.7 This idea o f the mythic does not depend 
on specific similarities to Oedipus or any other model, but rather on formal 
structural repetition which creates a field o f expectations which it is then 
uniquely able to fulfill. Just as every television program  has a series of 
cliches, characters, remarks, and situations that viewers would be disap­
pointed to miss, Superm an and the m onkey stories are highly predictable. 
The contest betw een the signifying m onkey and the baboon is just like that 
in other texts betw een a monkey and lion; it is closely similar to the contest
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between Shine and the captain o f the Titanic, as well as between Stagolee 
and Billy Lyon (whose surnam e identifies him with the m onkey’s antagonist 
in the “jungle” setting).8 W hat Eco called “the iterative schem e” in Super­
man is, according to him, “that on which m ost famous writers have founded 
their fortunes.” This is only partly because audiences enjoy having the 
ideological presuppositions confirmed. Also contributing to the comforting 
mental massage is the purely formal pleasure in encountering the same 
words, the same ideas, the same figures again and again. The consumer 
delights in his own initiation. This sort o f literary delectation is not confined 
to the naive. Certainly in scholarly exchange in all disciplines, readers and 
listeners enjoy hearing jargon (that is, academic slang), familiar critics’ names, 
and book titles. Though each individual may have an idiosyncratic list, all 
recognition reinforces a sense o f belonging, just as the story o f the monkey 
in part creates a community. In neither case is the sensation of pleasure 
necessarily dependent upon agreem ent with the ideas expressed by the 
texts in question. Pleasure in the familiar is the self-reward o f competence, 
whether the competence is in telling dirty jokes, in spotting an archetype a 
mile away, or both at once.
Furtherm ore, familiarization is present in all language. W henever a word 
is used with apparent transparency, without m etaphor, ambiguity, or irony, 
whenever reader and text can settle into certainty that, yes, tables do exist, 
or that cause and effect is a reliable principle, or that stylish clothing gives 
an individual power, familiarization is present. It is elevated to a significant 
formal rule in the texts o f the signifying monkey as it may be in deviantly 
individual oeuvres like those o f grafRtists and William Burroughs (who, for 
all his cut-ups, is m ore redundant than Edgar Rice Burroughs). Repetition 
is not, as Shklovsky thought, the opposite o f defamiliarization, but rather its 
precondition and its complement. Referentiality m ust exist as a system of 
social conventions before tropes can twist meaning. Lack o f rhym e and 
internal rhym e have an effect in “The Monkey and the Baboon” only against 
a background o f regularly recurring end rhyme. Inform ation may be more 
densely packed into the code o f the text when a cultural m atrix o f highly 
conventional structures is available for reference and distortion.
Three main argum ents have been presented here to dem onstrate the 
constitutive role o f familiarization in the literary texts. It is the dom inant 
m ode by far in the greatest part o f the world’s verbal artifacts, it is particular­
ly likely to perform  the didactic function o f literature, and it affords plaisirs, 
as well, o f a sort associated with the reading of literary texts. It remains only 
to qualify these claims, for, though they foreground that half o f the nature 
o f literature frequendy neglected, it is still only a half.
Repetitive, non-challenging, apparently transparent structures in oral and 
popular literature have been devalued by some critics because they seem to 
declare an illegitimate certitude and discourage new thought. Culler, for 
instance, says that only rule-breaking literature can allow an “expansion of
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self.”9 The fact is that oral texts, too, like that o f the signifying monkey, have 
self-reflexive m om ents in which they indicate their own hollowness, the gap 
or difference between signifier and signified. It would be possible to re-enact 
for this generation N orm an Mailer’s feat in “The White Negro” 10 o f na tu r­
alizing existentialism (he complained that “only a Frenchm an” could produce 
“all but ineffable frissons o f m ental becom ing” like Sartre’s) by discovering 
it in the synapses o f the Harlem  hipster and his white imitators and counter­
parts. The m odem  version o f this m yth o f nationalities (effete French, theo­
retically inarticulate but inspired blacks, and the essential mediating American 
intellectual) would be to locate Derrida in the cultural artifacts o f black 
American street life. This may be done, but one m ust bear in mind that the 
Derridean signifying m onkey is only half the dialectic.
The word signify entered black American usage through the religious 
discourse o f  the New Testam ent.11 In the Bible, it is typically used to refer 
to prophetic, symbolic, ecstatic, apocalyptic utterance, thus to figured speech 
with ambiguous or elusive meaning. In the parable o f the sower and the 
seed, Christ says that such problematic language concealing meaning will 
persist until the end o f days when finally nothing will be hidden, but all will 
be abroad and known. Thus, before the eschaton, “signifying” or speech 
that hides m eaning is the only mode available to man. The word is used in 
the gospels only in John  and there only in a line repeated on three different 
occasions in which Christ speaks o f his approaching death, the passing out 
o f the world o f the logos.12 Here then is the sublime m yth that underlies the 
monkey as well as the comic trickster preacher whose words are always lies, 
John, the clever slave, and many similar figures. The term  signify as well as 
jive  carries connotations o f the essential capacity to lie which defines the sign 
and the poem  as Eco and Hesiod claim. Language am ong the storytellers 
whose works Abraham s collected is often called “shit,” as in “I talked my 
shit and I talked it well,” or when the perform er identifies himself as “old 
bullshitting Snell.” The monkey himself originates his adventures by decid­
ing “I guess I’ll start some shit” and what m ore properly than shit can be 
called D errida’s “always already gone”? The problematic referentiality of 
poetry is apparent in the formula favored by another o f A braham s’ infor­
mants, Arthur: “You w on’t believe this, b u t . . . .” The very formulaic nature 
of oral narrative, its reliance on conventions o f rhetoric and rhyme all 
underline its dubious truth value and its reciprocally emphatic intertext- 
uality. The signifying monkey, Shine from the T ita n icand Stagolee all have 
the same motive for adopting language that Kafka’s m onkey had. Language 
is the only available means o f gesturing toward communication until the 
Second Coming, for one who has fallen from Eden; it is that with which one 
copes, makes do, gets by.
The monkey can teach critics then that familiarization and defamiliariza­
tion are in terdependent and equally necessary for generating literary texts. 
Those who study primarily m odem  elite literature or who read other texts
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with critical concepts derived from  an exclusive bias in favor o f m odem  elite 
literature are likely to ignore the kinds o f structures that predom inate in 
literature as a whole. In fact, every linguistic act both conforms and noncon­
forms, plays at referentiality as well as fleeing it. The anxiety o f influence 
is balanced by a delight o f influence as in fact we love our parents as well 
as hating and fearing them. To write or to talk is to caress others erotically 
as well as to strike at them  aggressively. The recognition o f this balance 
derives particularly from  exam ination o f popular and oral texts like “The 
Monkey and the Baboon” and points toward the developm ent o f theoretical 
concepts that will m ore accurately describe the cultural production o f man. 
Such recognition does no t dilute the canon, but ra ther refines it; it does not 
point away from literature, bu t rather toward its heart.
NOTES
1 Roger D. Abrahams, Deep Down in the Jungle, rev. ed. (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), p. 148.
2 Compare the decorous Latin of Culler’s homo significans in Jonathan Culler, Structural Poetics 
(London: Roudedge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 130.
3 See Leo Lowenthal, Literature, Popular Culture, and Society (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1961).
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107-124.
8 In each case a clever but vulnerable hero is pitted against a more powerful opponent. The 
texts are all printed in Abrahams, Chapter 5.
9 Culler, p. 129.
10 Norman Mailer, “The White Negro,” in Advertisements for Myself (New York: G. P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1959), pp. 337-358.
11 Since “signify” entered slang usage as a learned rather than a vulgar term, it seems 
obvious that it derived from religious usage, though no documentation of the connection has 
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are Thomas Kochman, Rappin’ and Stylin’ Out (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972) and 
William Labov, Language in the Inner City (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972).
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